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AND POLADS; FOR AIT TAIPEI FROM AIT WASHDC FOR C

EO 12356 N/A

SUBJECT: PUBLIC AFFAIRS GUIDANCE NO. 88-13: GENEVA
NEGOTIATIONS ON AFGHANISTAN
REFERENCE: STATE 14937-C

BACKGROUND: AS STRESSED IN REFTEL, THE USSR -- HAVING
ANNOUNCED ON FEBRUARY 8 ITS INTENTION TO BEGIN TO WITHDRAW
ITS TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN BY MAY 15 IF AN AGREEMENT IS
REACHED IN GENEVA BY MARCH 15 -- MAY WORK TO PLACE THE BLAME
FOR ANY FAILURE TO REACH AN AGREEMENT AT THE U.N.-SPONSORED
PROXIMITY TALKS ON THE U.S. AND/OR PAKISTAN. THIS EFFORT MAY
NOW BE UNDERWAY AT GENEVA.

THE ISSUES:

SINCE THE CURRENT ROUND OF GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS OPENED ON
MARCH 2, TWO PRINCIPAL POINTS OF CONTENTION HAVE EMERGED.
ONE IS THE PAKISTANI INSISTENCE THAT THE U.N. WITHDRAWAL PLAN
BE LINKED TO PROVISIONS FOR A NEW TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IN
KABUL ACCEPTABLE TO THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE AND REFUGEES. THEY
STRESS THIS IS ESSENTIAL TO ASSURE THAT FURTHER VIOLENCE BE
AVOIDED AND TO ALLOW THE ORDERLY RETURN TO AFGHANISTAN OF THE
3 MILLION REFUGEES NOW IN PAKISTAN. THE U.S. AGREES WITH
PAKISTAN ON THIS POINT BUT HAS NOT PUBLICLY PRESSED THE ISSUE.

THE SECOND POINT CONCERNS MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE
CONTENDING AFGHAN FORCES DURING THE NINE MONTH TROOP
WITHDRAWAL PERIOD AGREED UPON. THE SOVIETS DEMAND THAT OTHER
COUNTRIES CEASE THEIR MILITARY AID TO THE RESISTANCE WHILE
THEY (THE SOVIETS) CONTINUE THEIR MILITARY AID TO THE KABUL
REGIME. THE U.S. INSISTS INSTEAD ON A "SYMMETRICAL"
REDUCTION IN MILITARY AID TO THE CONTENDING PARTIES WITHOUT
WHICH THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE ITS ASSISTANCE TO THE
RESISTANCE. ANY OBLIGATIONS THE U.S. UNDERTAKES AS A
"GUARANTOR" OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS MUST BE "BALANCED BY
RECIPROCAL OBLIGATIONS TAKEN ON BY THE OTHER SIDE (THE
SOVIETS)."

THE ONLY LOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NON-INTERVENTION AND
NON-INTERFERENCE PROVISIONS OF THE DRAFT GENEVA ACCORD IS
THAT THEY SHOULD ALSO APPLY TO THE USSR. THE SOVIETS CANNOT
CLAIM TO AID A FACTION IN THE AFGHAN CIVIL STRIFE JUST
BECAUSE THAT PARTICULAR FACTION TRIES TO CLAIM IT IS THE
GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN. IN FACT, THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN
IS ON THE CENTRAL ISSUE OF THE VERY LEGITIMACY OF THE KABUL
REGIME. CUTTING OFF AID TO THE RESISTANCE WHILE THE SOVIETS
CONTINUE TO SUPPLY MILITARY AID TO THE KABUL REGIME WOULD
PLACE THE RESISTANCE AT A SEVERE MILITARY DISADVANTAGE AND
UNDERMINE THEIR PAST HEROIC EFFORTS. THE U.S. WILL NOT DO IT.

ACTION REQUESTED: POST, IN DISCUSSIONS WITH ITS CONTACTS,
PARTICULARLY IN THE EVENT THAT THE SOVIETS TRY TO USE THE
ABOVE OR OTHER PRETEXTS TO AVOID THEIR COMMITMENT TO
WITHDRAW, SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT RAPID SOVIET
WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN IS THE CENTRAL ISSUE. SOVIET
FAILURE TO DO SO, USING ONE PRETEXT OR ANOTHER, WOULD ONLY
DEMONSTRATE ITS DUPLICITY AND ITS DISREGARD FOR THE
OVERWHELMING DESIRE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY FOR SOVIET
WITHDRAWAL AS EXPRESSED THROUGH ANNUAL UNGA RESOLUTIONS.
MOSCOW AND Leningrad MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. (P/G)

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